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Abstract
#is research paper examines how e"ective public opinion is at in&uencing 
U.S. foreign policy and makes predictions on what this relationship will 
look like in the future.  #e research was qualitative in nature, examining 
information found in speeches and remarks made by government actors as 
well as the general public.  #e research focused on two case studies; the 
Vietnam War and the Iraq War, and found that the top decision maker in 
government at the time of each con&ict, namely the President, carried out 
policies that often disregarded public opinion entirely.  #e implications 
of this research indicate that as the U.S. attempts to retain its hegemonic 
status, future foreign policy decision will become less representative of the 
masses and will more closely resemble an oligarchy rather than a democracy.
Real World Observation
On September 10, 2014, !e New York Times reported that President Barack 
Obama had authorized a military campaign against the Sunni militant group 
paideia
68
known as ISIS, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.1 #e authorized cam-
paign calls for American airstrikes in Syria as well as the deployment of 475 
military advisors to Iraq.2 #ese military advisors are being sent in order 
to assist the Kurdish and Iraqi forces with more training, intelligence, and 
equipment against these $ghters.3 President Obama made it clear that these 
forces will not be used in any combat capacity, but will strictly be there to 
support U.S. allies in the region.4 #is new authorization will bring the to-
tal number of American troops in Iraq to 1,600.5 #e President also called 
on Congress to authorize the allocation of resources in order to “train and 
equip” the opposition forces $ghting the Assad regime in Syria.6 #is new 
authorization comes just two weeks after the President was criticized for 
not having a strategy to deal with the rising threat, paralleling the change 
in public opinion,7 with 53% of adults approving of the plan.8
#is rapid change in the administration’s position towards ISIS is not an 
outlier in the history of executive action, and it is important to put this most 
recent announcement into the context of recent history.  A year to the day 
before the speech President Barack Obama gave regarding ISIS, he gave a 
speech discussing America’s involvement Syria.9 In it, Obama argued the 
bene$ts of limited airstrikes in Syria,10 counter to the prevailing opinion of 
the public of noninvolvement.11 Just a few weeks earlier, Obama stated that 
1  Mark Landler, “Obama, in Speech on ISIS, Promises Sustained E"ort to Rout Militants,” 
!e New York Times, September 10, 2014.
2  Ibid.
3  Statement by the President on ISIL. #e White House, September 10, 2014.
4  Ibid.
5  Lander, “Obama, in Speech on ISIS.” 
6  “Statement by the President on ISIL.” #e White House
7  Lander, “Obama, in Speech on ISIS.”
8  “Bipartisan Support for Obama’s Military Campaign Against ISIS,” Pew Research Center 
for People and the Press, September 15, 2014.
9  Katie Zezima, “How Obama’s second Sept. 10 Syria speech in a row was di"erent this 
year – and how it wasn’t,” !e Washington Post, September 10, 2014.
10  Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria. #e White House, Septem-
ber 10, 2013.
11  “American Views on Intervention in Syria,” !e New York Times/CBS News Poll, Septem-
ber 10, 2013.
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he “will seek authorization for the use of force from the American people’s 
representatives in Congress” and not use his executive authority.12 #e choice 
by the president to defer the decision to Congress, and not use executive 
action, shows that this is not the $rst time Obama has entertained the pub-
lic’s interest in foreign policy matters. An earlier example occurred near the 
end of the Bush administration. In 2007, 63% of the public was in favor 
of their congressional representatives voting for a bill to withdraw troops 
from Iraq in the next year.13 #e following year, Bush announced that there 
would be a withdrawal of 8,000 troops by February of 2009, appearing to 
give in to the public’s will.  While Bush wielded his authority in order to 
appease the public, Obama left the decision up to Congress, or the people 
directly.14 #ese instances show that the quick policy decisions and changes 
made by executives occur regardless of the administration, and give context 
when looking at other historical examples.
#e in&uence that public opinion has on the executives who make con-
temporary U.S. foreign policy is a very important relationship study, and has 
profound implications for how we understand the formulation of American 
foreign policy.  If U.S foreign policy is always guided by the prevailing public 
opinion, polices can be shortsighted and overlook key issues. #e tendency 
for policies to not be as informed if guided by public opinion can be seen in 
a study done by Rogers, Stuhler, and Koeing in which they $nd that there 
is a “large gap” between the opinions of knowledgeable experts and that of 
the general public.15 #e researchers go on to make the assertion that the 
foreign policy opinions of experts were “speci$c, many-sided, analytical, and 
&exible,” while the general public’s opinions “tended to be vague and sporad-
ic.”16 On the other hand, if public opinion is not a part of the equation in 
U.S. foreign policy formulation, then is it still accurate to label the U.S. as a 
12  Statement by the President on Syria. #e White House, August 31, 2013.
13  “A Summer of Discontent with Washington,” Pew Research Center for the People and the 
Press, August 2, 2007.
14  Ewen MacAskill, “Bush limits Iraq troop withdrawal to 8,000 and orders ‘quiet surge’ in 
Afghanistan,” !e Guardian September 9, 2008.
15  William C. Rogers, Barbara Stuhler, and Donald Koeing, “A Comparison of Informed 
and General Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy,” !e Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 31, 
No. 2 (Summer, 1967): 242-252.
16  Ibid.
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representative democracy?  It seems as if public opinion has an e"ect on the 
formulation and path of U.S. foreign policy, but it is unclear by how much 
of a role it plays.  #is uncertainty leads me to ask the following question: 
How e"ective is public opinion at in&uencing U.S. foreign policy?
Conventional Wisdom
#e democratic ideal of a responsive, representative government illustrates 
the prevailing belief that public opinion matters in both domestic and foreign 
issues.  #is ideal is an essential part of American political culture, one that 
the public whole-heartedly believes in.  For instance, in a poll conducted 
by World Public Opinion, 81% of respondents said that when governmental 
leaders are making an important decision, they “should pay attention to 
public opinion polls because this will help them get a sense of the public’s 
views.”17  #is $nding is further backed up by the principle expressed in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that “the will of the people should be 
the basis of the authority of government,” with 87% of Americans agreeing.18 
In a study done by the Pew Research Center for People and the Press, polling 
data shows that the long-range policy priorities of the general public and 
the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) are similar in several key areas.19 
Both believe that protecting the U.S. from terrorism is a top priority, with 
83% of the public and 76% of the CFR. #ere is also large overlap in regard 
to preventing the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, with 73% of the 
public and 81% of the CFR making it a priority.20 When there is large overlap 
between the opinions of the public and those of policy elites, it seems clear 
that public opinion is e"ective at in&uencing foreign policy. However, the 
idealism of democracy is not always the reality of democracy, and it would 
be a mistake to draw such a conclusion.
#is conventional wisdom is misleading because it suggests that the general 
public has a direct role in which policies are top priorities, when evidence 
17  “American Public Says Government Leaders Should Pay Attention to Polls,” World Public 
Opinion.org, March 21, 2008.
18  Ibid.
19  “Public Sees U.S. Power Declining as Support for Global Engagement Slips: America’s 
Place in the World 2013,” Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, December 3, 
2013.
20  Ibid.
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suggests otherwise. Such evidence can be seen when looking at the public’s 
opinion on the war in Iraq. At the start of the war in 2003, public support 
was at a high of 74%.21 Yet just a few years later in 2007 public support for 
the war had dropped to 40%, with a majority of 53% of the public favoring 
withdrawal.22 Even though the majority opinion favored a change in poli-
cy, the change did not happen for another 4 years, when the war o!cially 
ended.23 If the conventional wisdom were entirely true, the timeline of the 
war would have paralleled the changes in the public opinion. #e fact that 
it didn’t show that foreign policy is not always in&uenced by public opinion, 
illustrates a &aw in the conventional wisdom.
"eoretical Paradigm
 To best understand the research question and the case studies presented, 
the research is framed using the theoretical paradigm of U.S. foreign policy 
known as group dynamics. #is theory was de$ned by Dorwin Cartwright and 
Alvin Zander as a “$eld of inquiry dedicated to advancing knowledge about 
the nature of groups, the laws of their development, and their interrelations 
with individuals, other groups, and larger institutions.”24 In regard to U.S. 
foreign policy and international relations, the theory of group dynamics is 
predicated on the belief that special interests or elites, not the state, in&uence 
political outcomes.25 #is general beliefs leads to the other core assumptions 
of the group dynamics theory.  #e $rst of these core assumptions is that 
decision-making actors are susceptible to the in&uence of groupthink.26 #e 
people in a decision-making position are constantly interacting with others 
in their respective groups.  #ese interactions in the group might “exert 
pressures for conformity to group norms,”27 an inherently bad thing, as it 
21  Scott Keeter, “Trends in Public Opinion about the War in Iraq, 2003-2007,” Pew Research 
Center, March 15, 2007.
22  Ibid.
23  “Barack Obama: All US Troops to Leave Iraq in 2011,” BBC News, October 21, 2014.
24  Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, “Origins of Group Dynamics,” Group Dynamics, 
3rd Edition, (1968): 3-21.
25  C. Wright Mills, !e Power Elite (Oxford University Press, 1956).
26  Ole R. Holsti. “Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy.” Diplomatic Histo-
ry 13, no 1. (1989).
27  Ibid.
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can “inhibit the search for information and policy options . . . suppressing 
some forms of intragroup con&ict that might serve to clarify goals, values, 
and opinions.”28 A second core assumption of group dynamics theory is 
that when it comes to the group of decision-makers, “the power elite,”29 its 
members are from small group of “political, economic, and military men.” 
30 According to this assumption, this group comes from “the upper third of 
the income and occupational pyramids,” which makes this group relatively 
unrepresentative of the majority.  It is this assumption that is most pertinent 
to the research presented in this paper.31
Group dynamics, and the assumptions stated above, is the most appropri-
ate and $tting theory to frame and explain the in&uence of public opinion 
on U.S. foreign policy.  First, group dynamics’ assumption that individuals 
or groups, not the state, in&uence political outcomes helps frame the case 
studies presented in this paper regarding decisions of Presidents during 
wartime.  #is is due to the concept of groupthink, since the policy decision 
makers are not interacting with the public on a daily basis, and do not view 
the public as their peers. #e people they do interact with daily, their peers, 
will inherently place pressures on the decision makers to appease or con-
form to the group thinking, potentially having “a signi$cant impact on the 
substance and quality of decisions.”32 #is theory has a negative viewpoint 
concerning the research question. #e fact that the decision maker group is 
separate from the public opinion suggests that they therefore do not have 
an in&uence on policy formulation. #e second assumption made by this 
theory regarding the make-up of the “power elite” further highlights its use-
fulness when framing the answer to the research question. By assuming that 
the power elite are comprised of an unrepresentative minority of industry 
leaders, the ine"ectiveness of the public opinion’s in&uence becomes clear. 
How can public opinion compete with the in&uence that this small group 
of people have, a group who are interacting with each other every day and 
developing personal relationships?  It is because of these assumptions that 
28  Ibid.
29  Mills, !e Power Elite
30  Ibid.
31  Ibid.
32  Holsti, “Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy.”
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the theory of group dynamics best frames the answer to the research question 
presented in this paper.
"e Vietnam War
#e military operation in Vietnam that lasted from November 1955 until 
April 1975 is one of notoriety in United States history.  It was a timed $lled 
with protests and civil disobedience, as well as a period in which the leaders 
of the U.S. faced the challenge of balancing policy they deemed appropriate 
and the policy the public demanded.  In retrospect, most people, public and 
policy elite, consider the Vietnam engagement as a mistake, one some deem 
an “important history lesson.”33 Yet when this was a contemporary issue, that 
sentiment was not as wide spread, with many of the policy elites deeming 
the war e"ort a righteous one based on democratic principles.34 Due to the 
contradictory relationship between the public and the policy elites during 
the Vietnam War, this period is important to consider when attempting to 
answer the research question. 
In order to study this relationship properly, it will be important to ap-
proach this case study in a chronological fashion.  By observing how the war 
developed over time, and the policy decisions that a"ected it, the cause and 
e"ect relationship between the public opinion and the policy decisions should 
become apparent. U.S. involvement in Vietnam began during the Eisenhower 
administration in November of 1955.35 Initially, U.S. involvement played a 
strictly supportive role, not a military one.  In Eisenhower’s Annual Budget 
Message to the Congress for the Fiscal Year of 1956, he proposed to “furnish 
defense support to several countries” in Southeast Asia, Vietnam included.36 
#is was in response to the general fear of Communist subversion at the 
33  “Anti-War Sentiment Dominates Talk Airwaves,” Pew Research Journalism Project, August 
30, 2007.
34  Lyndon B. Johnson: “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” 
January 12, 1966. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency 
Project.
35  U.S. Department of Defense. Press Operations. “Name of Technical Sergeant Richard B. 
Fitzgibbon to be Added to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.” (November 6, 1998).
36  Dwight D. Eisenhower: “Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1956,” 
January 17, 1955. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency 
Project.
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time.37 #e prevailing belief of foreign policy elites was the Domino #eory, 
which theorizes that in order to prevent $ghting at home the U.S. must 
engage the Communist ideal in foreign countries, lest the weaker states fall 
and Communism comes knocking on the U.S.’s doorstep.38 Due to this fear 
of Communism, those who were informed generally accepted the assistance 
to a number of Southeast Asian countries that Eisenhower had proposed, but 
the majority of U.S. citizens were unaware of the involvement at all.39 Due 
to this lack of an informed public, the public opinion of such a policy was 
irrelevant to the policy elites at the time, since there simply was not one.  #e 
lack of an obvious public opinion lead most policy leaders to believe that a 
policy of assistance to these countries was one that was supported by most. 
#is was seen in the next administration, when President John F. Kennedy 
informed the President of the Republic of Vietnam that the U.S. would 
promptly increase the assistance to the Vietnamese defense e"ort in 1961.40 
Yet this ambiguity of the public towards Vietnam policy would soon change.
#e development of a public opinion towards U.S. involvement in Vietnam 
took o" during the Johnson administration.  At the onset of his administration, 
President Lyndon B. Johnson followed his predecessors’ example, only gradually 
increasing the support sent to Vietnam.41  By 1965 the President was “convinced 
that the country, for the most part, [was] with him; that there [was] only a small 
minority dissent from his Vietnam policies.”42 #is belief led the President to 
continue with the Vietnam policy that he deemed appropriate, increasing the 
extent of U.S. involvement in the war by authorizing air strikes on military targets 
37  Ibid.
38  Jean Collins, “#e Domino #eory,” !e North American Review, Vol. 252, No. 3 (May, 
1967): 19-20.
39  William L. Lunch and Peter W. Sperlich, “American Public Opinion and the War in 
Vietnam,” !e Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1 (March, 1979): 21-44.
40  John F. Kennedy: “Exchange of Messages With the President of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam.,” December 15, 1961. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e 
American Presidency Project.
41  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1965,” January 
21, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
42  Lester Markel, “Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” !e New York Times, August 
8, 1965.
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and increasing the U.S. $ghting force to 190,000 men.43 In the same speech, 
Johnson addressed the American people with a forceful statement; “#e days 
may become months, and the months may become years, but we will stay as 
long as aggression commands us to battle,” a statement that was a prelude to 
the arduous future of the war.44 It seems that this was an example in which 
policy elites were in&uenced by the public opinion, yet this is not the case, as 
the belief in the support of the majority that Johnson held was an inaccurate 
one.  An article published in !e New York Times on March 27, 1966 reported, 
“many thousands took part in demonstrations during the day” in a number 
of large cities throughout the U.S.45 In New York City, there were between 
20,000 and 25,000 marchers on Fifth Avenue alone.46 Protests were taking 
place in other cities around the country on that same day, likely with similar 
numbers. It would be a mistake to consider an active vocal group numbering 
in the tens of thousands as a “small minority of dissent.”47 A study done by the 
Gallup organization the following year found that a majority of respondents 
to a survey disapproved of the way that President Johnson was handling the 
situation in Vietnam,48 further showing the inaccuracy in the amount of sup-
port for President Johnson. Even as evidence was presented that suggested the 
policy choices that the President made were not following the policy decisions 
the public wanted, Johnson remained steadfast on his policy choices.  In his 
State of the Union Address in 1968, Johnson outlined how increased support 
for the war was needed and authorized the deployment of additional 13,500 
men, only weeks after he had sent about 11,000 additional Marine and airborne 
troops.49 #is decision made by the President shows just how ine"ective public 
opinion was at in&uencing U.S. foreign policy during this administration. 
43  Johnson, “State of the Union.” (1966).
44  Ibid.
45  Douglas Robinson, “#ousands on Fifth Ave. March in Vietnam Protest,” !e New York 
Times, March 27, 1966.
46  Ibid.
47  Markel, “Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam.”
48  Gallup Organization, “Gallup Poll # 1967-0742: Vietnam War/1968 Presidential Elec-
tion,” March 9-14, 1967.
49  Lyndon B. Johnson, “#e President’s Address to the Nation Announcing Steps To Limit 
the War in Vietnam and Reporting His Decision Not To Seek Reelection,” March 31, 
1968. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
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As the Nixon administration took over, many members of the public hoped 
that Nixon would simply end the war immediately by ordering the U.S. 
forces home.50 Yet Nixon did not do this, stating, “I would have betrayed 
my solemn responsibility as President of the United States if I had done 
so.”51 #is is an extremely telling quote, as it gives insight into the mindset 
of foreign policy elites.  According to Nixon, adhering to the whims of the 
public opinion, concerning foreign policy, is a terrible thing for the country 
as a whole.  #is is counter to the prevailing popular belief in Democratic 
#eory, in which the public should be an important actor in governmental 
decision-making.52 If policy elites share this belief, it might explain why 
public opinion is ine"ective in in&uence U.S. foreign policy. 
By 1971, it was common knowledge among the public and policy elites that 
polling data showed an overwhelming majority of Americans wanted the troops 
out of Vietnam by the end of the year, with a staggering 75% of people reputing 
the President’s policy.53 Even with such a large majority of the American public 
calling for an end to the war in Vietnam, it persisted through the rest of the 
Nixon administration and into the Ford administration.  U.S. involvement 
in Vietnam did not end until President Gerald Ford announced on April 29, 
1975 that “the military situation in the area [Saigon] deteriorated rapidly… I 
therefore ordered the evacuation of all American personnel remaining in South 
Vietnam.”54 #e public had $nally achieved what they wanted, after voicing 
their opinion for over a decade.  It is clear that during the Vietnam War public 
opinion was at best commentary about the war, with little in&uence over foreign 
policy formulation.  Instead, the policies made by policy elites during the war 
were the policies they deemed most appropriate, regardless of the public opinion. 
President Nixon stated this in a response to a letter he received from a university 
student, “the policies we are now following re&ect our own best judgment, 
50  Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on Vietnam,” May 14, 1969. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
51  Ibid.
52  “American Public Says Government Leaders Should Pay Attention to Polls,” World Public 
Opinion.org.
53  Reo M. Christenson, “Vietnam and Public Opinion,” !e New York Times July 3, 1971.
54  Gerald R. Ford, “Statement Following Evacuation of United States Personnel From the 
Republic of Vietnam,” April 29, 1975. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e 
American Presidency Project.
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based on exhaustive study of all the available evidence, of how to achieve 
that goal. To abandon that policy merely because of a public demonstra-
tion would therefore be an act of gross irresponsibility on my part.”55 #is 
sentiment would persist through many administrations, guiding executives 
like George W. Bush to continually disregard the majority public opinion 
in favor of the policy elite throughout his involvement in the Iraq War. 
"e Iraq War
#e Iraq War is another important case study to examine as it shares many 
similarities with the Vietnam War, such as a supportive public in the be-
ginning with a quick shift to public dissatisfaction as the war wore on. 
Meanwhile, policy elites and administration o!cials remained steadfast in 
their commitment to see the war through, claiming the $ghting was for 
democratic principles just as their predecessors did forty years before.56 A 
key di"erence, however, between the two con&icts is the fact the onset of the 
Iraq War was brought on by the terrorist attacks carried out on September 
11, 2001 against the United States, while there was no attack on U.S. soil 
before the Vietnam War.57 Another key di"erence is that the Vietnam War 
spanned across four di"erent administrations, while the Iraq War only 
spanned two.  It is important to shed light on these di"erences as they 
have implications on the mood of the public opinion, and therefore are an 
important aspect of this research. In order to understand the relationship 
shared between U.S. foreign policy and the public opinion it will again 
be important to continue through this case study chronologically. Again, 
this will help to illustrate the cause and e"ect relationship between public 
opinion and foreign policy decisions.
As stated before, the catalyst of the Iraq War was the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
in New York City. It was originally believed that Iraq and the Hussein regime 
55  Richard Nixon, “Letter to University Student Randy J. Dicks on the “Vietnam Morato-
rium,” October 13, 1969. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American 
Presidency Project.
56  George W. Bush, “Remarks on Signing the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations 
Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004,” November 6, 
2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
57  George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” March 17, 2003. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
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had supported al-Qaeda to some capacity in carrying out the attack,58 and 
that it was working to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).59 Due 
to the passage of the “Joint Resolution to Authorize the use of United States 
Armed Forces against #ose Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched 
against the United States,” the president had the authority to “take military 
action against any nation, organization, or persons that had been involved 
in the 9/11 attacks.”60 #e Bush administration was determined to include 
Iraq in this group, and in his 2002 State of the Union Address, Bush began 
his campaign to do this.  In his speech he labeled Iraq as a member of a 
new “axis of evil” consisting of states aimed at threatening the peace of the 
world.61  He would continue to de$ne how big of a threat Hussein was to the 
United States throughout the year, until, on October 10th and 11th, Congress 
passed the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution 
of 2002.”62 By March of the following year, the United States had begun 
military operations in Iraq,63 and by May of that same year, President Bush 
announced that, “major combat operations in Iraq have ended” from the 
deck of the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln.64
So what was going through the minds of the American public throughout 
this period of quick, policy decisions?  Well, in general, most of the public 
58  George W. Bush, “Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives Transmitting a 
Supplemental Appropriations Request for Ongoing Military and Intelligence Operations 
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Elsewhere,” September 17, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and 
John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project. 
59  George W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the 
Union,” January 29, 2002. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American 
Presidency Project. 
60  Ole R. Holsti, American Public Opinion on the Iraq War (University of Michigan Press, 
November 2011).
61  Bush, “Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union,” 2002.
62  U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. International Relations Committee. 2002. Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002. 107th Congress, Second 
Session, October 10 – 11 and October 16.
63  George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” March 19, 2003. Online by Gerhard 
Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency Project.
64  George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Iraq From the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln,” 
May 1, 2003. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, #e American Presidency 
Project.
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was supportive of the policy, with Bush’s approval rating reaching a peak of 
76% after the fall of Baghdad.65 It was easy for the public to support such a 
foreign policy since the war e"ort was to prevent Iraq from acquiring WMDs, 
further the growing “global war on terrorism,”66 and promote democracy.67 
#is might suggest a causal relationship between the public opinion and the 
policy decisions made, however causality is not present.  #e policies made by 
the Bush administration at the onset of the Iraq War were not in response to 
public polling data, but rather policies the administration wanted to pursue.68 
Paul Wolfowitz, the United States Deputy Secretary during the $rst term of 
the Bush administration, stated, “We settled on [WMDs as the core reason 
to go to war because] everyone could agree.”69 It was not as though the public 
believed Iraq had WMDs and then pressured their elected o!cials to pursue a 
more aggressive policy, but rather the elected o!cials framing their policy so 
“everyone could agree.”70 However, this massive support would not last, and as 
of 2004, Bush’s approval rating began a slow, consistent, decline.71
At the beginning of 2004, public opinion for the Iraq War was positive, with 
between 54% and 58% saying that the war was not a mistake.72 Five months 
later, after the announcement that the U.S. would transfer sovereignty back to 
Iraq, polling data found that the percent of Americans in support of the war 
had fallen to 46%.73 A large majority of the public believed that the transfer 
of power was a sign that U.S. policy was failing because the transfer occurred 
before the U.S. could bring about stability in the country.74 When asked how 
long they thought the U.S. should have a signi$cant number of troops in Iraq, 
65  Joseph Carroll, “#e Iraq-Vietnam Comparison,” Gallup Organization, June 15, 2004.
66  Holsti, American Public Opinion on the Iraq War
67  Bush, “Remarks on Singing the Emergency…” 2003.
68  Holsti, American Public Opinion on the Iraq War
69  Ibid.
70  Ibid.
71  Carroll, “#e Iraq-Vietnam comparison”
72  Ibid.
73  Lydia Saad, “Americans Applaud Transfer of Sovereignty to Iraq: Have mixed expectations 
for future of Iraq,” Gallup Organization, June 29, 2004.
74  Ibid.
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the study found that a majority said less than a year.75 By the end of the year, 
a majority of people disapproved of the United States’ decision to go to war 
with Iraq.76 #e quick decline in public approval for the Iraq war is likely 
due to the lack of any evidence suggesting Iraq had WMDs and revelations 
made by the 9/11 Commission.  In October of 2003, David Kay, the head 
of the group responsible for locating WMDs in Iraq, gave a preliminary 
report to Congress in which he stated that his inspection team had failed 
to $nd any WMDs in the country.77 #e summer of the next year, the 9/11 
Commission found that there was “no credible evidence that Iraq and al 
Qaeda had cooperated on attacks against the U.S.”78 #ese $ndings showed 
that the Bush administration was incorrect when they began to formulate 
the Iraq policy that would de$ne the decade.  #ese blunders of the admin-
istration are likely what led to the quick change in public opinion.
By 2005, the growing public opinion was that the war in Iraq was going 
badly for the United States.79 Regardless, the Bush administration pushed on 
with their Iraq policy.  In an interview on CNN, then Vice President Dick 
Cheney stated, “we’ll leave as soon as the task is over with.”80 President Bush 
continued in this rhetoric when he said, “we’re not leaving, so long as I’m the 
President.”81 #e true e"ect or lack thereof, that public opinion had on for-
eign policy during the Iraq War is evident when listening to Bush’s own words 
regarding the matter, “I don’t think you’ve ever heard me say, ‘Gosh, I’d better 
change position because the polls say this or that’… I’m going to do what I 
think is right, and if people don’t like me for it, that’s just the way it is.”82 #is 
idea became practice when Bush committed an additional 20,000 American 
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troops and an additional carrier strike group to Iraq,83 even as polling data 
showed that 60% of Americans believed that originally sending troops to 
Iraq was a mistake,84 and a majority believed that U.S. troops should be 
withdrawn from Iraq within a year.85 It was not until the end of 2008 that 
Bush $nally announced a decrease in the U.S. military presence, when he 
stated, “Iraqi forces will now take the lead in security operations in Anbar, 
with American troops moving into an over-watch role.”86 
De-escalation of U.S. military involvement in Iraq began when President 
Barack Obama took o!ce in 2009.  In a speech given at Camp Lejeune, North 
Carolina, the President announced that the U.S. combat mission would end 
by August 31, 2010, leaving only transitional forces to be removed by the end 
of 2011.87 #e war was $nally over on December 15, 2011 when the President 
announced that the troops were preparing to make their $nal march out of the 
country.88 #e Iraq War is evidence of the ine"ectiveness that public opinion 
truly has on U.S. foreign policy.  For half of Bush’s Presidency, the policy deci-
sions he was making were the policy choices that the majority public opinion 
didn’t want.  Perhaps because of this, “nearly two-thirds say his administration 
will be remembered more for its failures than its accomplishments.”89
Implications
#e ine"ectiveness that public opinion has on U.S. foreign policy is telling of 
the future of how the U.S. public, and the world, views U.S. foreign policy. 
As other states make gains in catching up to the United States in terms of 
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hegemonic power, the U.S. attempts to retain their unipolar status, most 
notably with the “pivot to Asia,” which is “aimed at increasing America’s 
in&uence in Asia” to counter a growing China.90 At the same time, the United 
States has the ongoing mission of spreading democracy and the ideals that 
are a part of it.91 #is is clear when looking at the case studies presented in 
this paper, for administrations in both the Vietnam92 and Iraq93 war claimed 
a large part of the war e"ort was to spread democracy.  Due to the fact that 
these are important policy issues for the United States, the foreign policy 
decisions made in the future will become ever important. 
#e future importance of foreign policy decisions reveal the inaccuracy of 
the conventional wisdom that public opinion should and does have a large 
amount of in&uence over U.S. foreign policy decisions.  .  It is clear from 
the research $ndings that policy elites do not adhere to the will of the people 
when it comes to foreign policy decisions, but rather, “must necessarily engage 
in the process of ‘manufacturing consent’ from the public.”94 #is “manu-
factured consent” is highlighted by Ole R. Holsti, who wrote, “policies are 
chosen beforehand, polls used to spin them.”95 #e idea presented here shows 
just how policy is formed without thinking of the public opinion.  In fact, 
according to Holsti, the only important thing that the public opinion is good 
for is learning how to sell policy decisions to the public.  #is “manufactured 
consent” is evidence that decision-making is becoming more concentrated 
in the power elite.  #e power elite is extremely under representative of the 
public, as it is comprised of industry leaders from political, economic, and 
military sectors.96 #ese members consider each other as “among those who 
count,”97 e"ectively stating that the public does not count, and therefore the 
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public opinion does not count or matter.  As the decision makers of foreign 
policy become more concentrated in the “power elite,” the foreign policy 
decisions will become less representative of the public. #is will cause the 
future of U.S. foreign policy to resemble an oligarchy rather than a democracy, 
potentially a hindrance to the United States’ ability to spread democratic 
ideals overseas.  It is clear from the research presented that public opinion 
is not at all e"ective at in&uencing U.S. foreign policy.
